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Abstract 
Within his philosophy of life, I suggest that Masahiro Morioka is inviting us, at a basic level, to 
“think about thought,” which is an inclusive activity embracing all versions of philosophy as well as 
science. Only humans think philosophically, thus as an academic discipline his philosophy of life, to 
my mind, engages the unique quality of life, i.e., human consciousness. That is to say, his 
understanding philosophy of life, as an intellectual activity requires the human mind, within an 
historical and an evolutionary context, to recognize a unique “human self” and relate it to its 
environment without the aid of classical Greek philosophical categories. I suggest that Morioka’s 
thinking about nature, life and death, in the Western context may be compared favourably with the 
“dehellenization of thought,” as understood by Leslie Dewart.  
 
 
1. Commentary on Morioka’s Paper: “Philosophy of Life in Contemporary 
Society”  
 
It took me a few readings of Masahiro Morioka’s paper, “Philosophy of Life 
in Contemporary Society,” 1  presented in 2017 at the Fifth China-Japan 
Philosophical Forum (Ritsumeikan University) before I understood, I believe 
correctly, the intent of his particular point of view. Being a philosopher myself, 
although retired from formal teaching, I can appreciate his frustration with the 
lack of philosophical understanding in contemporary academia. As well, I can 
understand his intuitive attitude towards human life, having had that experience 
myself, which I found is often under-appreciated in Western philosophy.  
Philosophy of life, as he sees it, is a broad-based concept and too broad in 
fact, to be conceptualized within a single intellectual perspective. It requires 
more than one perspective. Thus, his philosophy of life constitutes a variety of 
approaches to human thinking requiring various epistemologies in interpreting 
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1 Morioka (2017). 
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human experience. 
The sciences have their place within his philosophy of life. These may be 
viewed collectively as intellectual activities proper to human beings, and like 
philosophy, amounting to “thinking about thought.” Such thinking about thought 
philosophically and scientifically characterizes the difference between human 
life and animal life, which appears to lack the ability to reflect on its own 
experience of life. All life, human and animal, is conscious but human 
consciousness has a specific capacity that animal consciousness lacks, that is, 
self-reflectiveness upon its own experience. (I prescind from any consideration 
of a “vegetative consciousness.”) Further, humans consciously give meaning to 
their experiences. Which is to say that animals fail to conceive an “image of 
life,” to use Morioka’s words. He notes that humans are able to contextualize 
their experience around the two poles of “irreplaceablility” and 
“interrelatedness.” Both poles are metaphysical notions. As metaphysical 
notions their meaning cannot be deduced merely from an organism’s activity. 
They must be assigned meaning arising from the experience of the individual 
thinker. Further, these particular notions are not like the metaphysical notions 
abstracted from the social sciences which do allow for the contextualization of 
their intellectual objects that, of themselves, have no concrete being, i.e., crowds, 
nations, political parties, ideological movements, a history, etc., which constitute 
images of life. 
To my mind, his understanding of philosophy of life as an academic 
discipline formalizes the various dynamic principles generated in human 
thinking. That is to say, thinking is not static, but it is an activity, an intellectual 
energy that involves the human mind in an historical, as well as an evolutionary 
perspective, the interpretation of which realizes a human self. A human self is 
not realized through the principles of a determinist philosophy. Nor does the 
human self consist of an “essence,” in the classical sense, to be discovered. As a 
social reality the interpreted and evolved self is a positive entity. A moment’s 
reflection will confirm that the self cannot negate itself. Rather, a human self as 
a living organism seeks to extend its presence even when aware of its own death. 
With an understanding of death, the question then becomes, for the human self, 
how to promote the extension of life through self-directed evolution in order to 
interpret the phenomenon of death on human terms, and not merely biologically 
(scientifically). This self-determination of the evolutionary process is a major 
theme in the writing of the Canadian academic Leslie Dewart (1922-2009).  
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Dissatisfied with their experience of the inadequacy of Western (Hellenistic) 
understanding, philosophers are motivated seek adequate answers to their 
questions. Within their search, what may need to be re-addressed in the future is 
the current idea of self-consciousness as the essence of a human being. In 
Western culture the understanding of self-consciousness as the essence of the 
human being is often accepted uncritically by philosophers and other academics. 
Rather than defining the essence of a human being, however, I suggest that 
self-consciousness is characteristic of human thinking, it is a quality, that 
distinguishes the consciousness of human life from the consciousness of animal 
life. While ordinary consciousness, that is, a non-reflexive human or animal 
consciousness, does not necessarily lead to thinking, self-consciousness does 
lead to thinking. Only a human organism can consciously think itself as an “I,” 
that is, to think about itself as a subject and simultaneously as an object.  
Morioka’s paper sets forth the “genesis” of the Journal of Philosophy of Life 
and the suggestion that “Philosophy of Life” (or thought about thought) become 
an academic discipline in its own right. Initially, I was skeptical as to this 
suggestion. Is not this task already being undertaken in some form or other 
which makes Morioka’s attempt just another variation on a theme? I asked 
myself that question. However, after re-reading his article and reconsidering his 
intention, and in light of my own experience in philosophical and theological 
thinking, I recognized his project as particularly purposeful. That is to say, his 
philosophy of life provides a forum for the philosophical perspective of 
dehellenization of Western thinking as promoted by the unconventional 
philosopher Leslie Dewart. Contemporary philosophers, Catholic and 
non-Catholic, may fail to appreciate the degree of institutional fear generated at 
that time by Dewart’s departure from the traditional scholastic formulation of 
Catholic philosophy.2 
Dewart admits of his unconventional academic status: 
 
Very few of the observations and concepts I have used in this 
investigation are original; indeed, most are not even new. What I have 
tried to accomplish here — the sort of task that philosophy had always 
deemed among its chief responsibilities, though in the anglophone world 
as I gather no longer — is mainly to arrange a large number of tesserae 
                                                     
2  In 1969 the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith examined the theological 
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that, if taken one by one, are very familiar, into the single mosaic of a 
fairly comprehensive and unconventional philosophical synthesis.3 
 
The word “dehellenization,” as I use it in this essay, most likely is unknown to 
the reader. In using it here, I have not left it as Dewart had introduced it 
throughout his writing. Rather, from my own perspective, I have engaged in 
what I understand was his attempt to re-think Western thought in the 
contemporary philosophical context. Hence, associating Dewart’s perspective 
with that of Morioka’s notion of philosophy of life. In Dewart’s works a 
philosopher will not find a single citation nor definition that exhausts Dewart’s 
understanding. A philosopher will need to follow Dewart’s application of the 
notion to gain an understanding of his meaning. Similarly, the reader must adopt 
the same approach in reading this essay. Then, hopefully, the notion of 
dehellenization will gain clarity and its parallel purpose in Morioka’s 
perspective will be recognized.  
But before proceeding further, I think that a few remarks that characterize 
the notion are in order at this point. First “dehellenization” is not a concept in 
any classical philosophical sense. It is an attitude, a stance, a way of 
approaching knowledge through experience. Dehellenization does not rely on an 
a priori understanding of anything as is characteristic of ancient Greek 
philosophical thinking. Secondly, dehellenization ultimately rejects the linguistic 
structure of the Indo-European languages in its epistemological structure which 
tends to reduce all concepts of the mind to an ontology. (Hence the amusing 
introduction of Shakespeare’s literary phrase “to be or not to be; that is the 
question” into the philosophical arena.)4 Thirdly (through its understanding of 
consciousness) dehellenization represents an evolution within Western 
philosophy beyond the traditional (inherited) approach to thinking. 
Consciousness has epistemological value, not merely psychological value. 
Fourthly, dehellenization has developed beyond the religious (theological) 
context in which Dewart first introduced it. This is evident even in his own 
thought and may be seen in his posthumously published book, Hume’s 
Challenge and the Renewal of Modern Philosophy.  
Overall dehellenization is a positive concept. However, reflecting the 
philosophical context in which it initially appeared, it displayed negative and 
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positive aspects. The first negative aspect assumed that the Western 
epistemological tradition is inadequate to express contemporary (religious) 
experience. The second aspect assumed that there is a breakdown of the 
foundations of Catholic belief in the modern world. While originating within the 
Catholic Christian philosophical tradition Dewart’s work is not necessarily 
reserved to that tradition and has implications for Reformed Christian Theology, 
and by further extension to Jewish and Muslim epistemological traditions. The 
first positive aspect called for a restoration of religious belief. The second 
positive aspect called for reconstruction of belief and the third positive aspect 
called for new meanings to be assigned in any future belief. Clearly, in light of 
an historical approach, it is easy to understand this last point within a secular 
philosophical context. In section 2, “Dehellenization: a corrective activity within 
Philosophy of Life,” I elaborate further on Dewart’s notion relating it to 
Morioka’s perspective. 
Like many philosophers Morioka’s thought is rooted in dissatisfaction, 
(frustration) in the way humans interpret their experience in thinking about life. 
To my way of thinking, such dissatisfaction provokes a desire for a 
comprehensive and (if need be, unconventional) philosophical synthesis. In his 
particular case, the discipline of bioethics lacked something necessary for it to 
achieve its goals properly, he tells us. Science and technology, of themselves, 
cannot answer our deeper questions. Our deeper questions must be 
philosophically answered by being interpreted within their existential context. 
An existential philosophical interpretation begins with the intuitive awareness of 
life and of the understanding of the environment. As I understand him, Morioka 
notes that many philosophies describe life, but he suggests that no philosophy 
independently probes into life as a discipline, that is, approaches life critically. 
Such independent and critical probing can be recognized in the contemporary 
social sciences and technologies. However, such probing when applied to 
non-scientific thought, or thinking, that is to philosophy, can expand the 
boundaries of what it means to think critically, and to think from within an 
historical and evolutionary point of view. In short, philosophy is required to 
interpret the universal significance of any particular experience. In other words, 
philosophy recognizes thought, or thinking, as a proper universal human 
activity.  
His questionnaire of “ordinary folk” revealed an untutored understanding of 
life gleaned from individual experience and subsequently expressed in the 
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non-technical and non-philosophical language of daily life. His interviewees 
were freed from an obligation to express their thoughts within the formal 
heritage of their culture. Such an approach within the Western context, that is 
being freed from one’s formal philosophical heritage, reflects Dewart’s 
dehellenized philosophy. To think freed from the categories of the philosophical 
Hellenistic tradition recognizes that our ideas and notions are not innate in our 
understanding. That our ideas and notions are not innate in our understanding is 
a major theme in Dewart’s thought that developed since he earned his PhD on 
Karl Pearson’s “scientific philosophy.” Karl Pearson (1857-1936) was an 
influential interpreter of philosophy and the place of science in society, who 
eventually abandoned classical philosophy for science.5 
Further, in opposition to the tradition of reductionist philosophy in the West, 
Morioka maintains the legitimacy of a metaphysical understanding of human 
experience. As I understand him, there is a relationship, not a connection, 
between the physical and that which is beyond the physical. (As I comprehend 
the terms, a relationship is characteristic of dynamic thought, with a capacity for 
growth; whereas, a connection is characteristic of static thought capable of 
construction.) In short, the former characterizes organic thought and the latter 
characterizes architectural or mechanical thought. Further, when describing an 
“academic research field” Morioka speaks of activities that probe into the 
understanding of life. Human activities, which have their origin in one’s will, 
open the possibility to an alternative interpretation of classical Western thinking 
which has been greatly influenced by the static idealist concepts of Hellenistic 
philosophy. However, quantum philosophical theory may be able to offer a new 
understanding of the activity of life.6 
Highly significant, to my way of thinking, is the inclusion of non-human life 
within Morioka’s perspective. Here he presents an interesting observation for the 
philosopher in the understanding of what it means to live a meaningful life. 
Humans assign meaning to their lives and, as well, to animal life.7 Non-human, 
or animal life, lacks this ability to assign meaning to itself or to other living 
                                                     
5 Dewart views Pearson’s discovery of a “creed of life” in science as a normal since “this apparent 
forsaking of philosophy for the sake of science should not appear surprising once we realise the nature 
of his thought.” University of Toronto (1954) PhD thesis: “The Development of Karl Pearson’s 
Scientific Philosophy.”  
6 See Rovelli (2104). 
7 From a philosophical perspective, the Judeo-Christian account in Genesis 1:26 and 2:18 provides an 
exception in that the non-human life form, God, assigns ultimate meaning to the human creature, 
whose representative Adam, assigns meaning to the other living creatures. 
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beings. It seems, up to this point at least, there is no serious reason to suggest the 
contrary. Dewart admits the consciousness of animal life, but he notes that it is 
through the self-consciousness of human life that meaning is determined and 
subsequently assigned, which is the “most fundamental role” of human 
consciousness.8 
In his essay Morioka has suggested that a new role might emerge within his 
philosophy of life. “We might be able to witness the emergence of a philosophy 
of life that bridges the East Asian traditions and analytic philosophy,” he wrote. 
Since it may resonate with Asian readers, I offer the quote below as an example 
of Dewart’s notion of “philosophical ancestry” with respect to the “dead” 
scholastic philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.  
 
The doctrine of St. Thomas, true enough as it was, is dead. But it is not 
dead as a doornail. It is dead as a venerable ancestor is dead, who begat 
an existence which begat ours in turn, and to whom we owe our 
consciousness and life. Ancestors are to be neither cursed and forgotten, 
nor left unburied and mummified in case they may suddenly find it 
possible to come back to the world. They are to be gratefully and 
regretfully buried; they are to be truthfully and honourably remembered, 
and their truth and virtue is to be perpetuated, not in the vain attempt to 
resuscitate them, but in the conscious exercise of our own descendant but 
independent life.9 
 
Within the Western philosophical tradition such an understanding is a 
foundational block for an attitude of the dehellenization of thought. 
At the risk of being accused of quibbling (as some philosophers are known 
to do) I would prefer to understand Morioka’s role for philosophy of life “as a 
bridge,” rather as a conduit between Eastern and Western ways of thinking. 
Why? While a bridge simply joins (connects) independent entities, a conduit 
implies a participatory activity (relationship) among independent entities. More 
comprehensive than simply providing a crossing from East to West and vice 
versa, a conduit between entities actually contributes to the transfer of notions 
and ideas that are incorporated reciprocally into Eastern and Western 
philosophical traditions. In short, a conduit is an active agent within philosophy 
                                                     
8 Dewart (1989), p. 127. 
9 Dewart (1969), p. 212. 
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of life, or thinking about thought. And itself participates in the transfer of 
knowledge to achieve a new understanding of both the knower and the known. 
Philosophically, this active conduit is consciousness. 
This new understanding of the knower and the known derives from the 
conscious re-arrangement of understanding what is already “there” in human 
experience. Strasser makes a parallel observation about scientists who view 
“individuals and groups as originators and organizers of their respective 
worlds,” and change their object of study while they study it and because they 
study it.10 In changing their object of study while they study it and because they 
study it nothing new is “brought-into-being,” in the sense of classical Western 
philosophy. As we know, in the Hellenist epistemological tradition only the 
knower, not the known, is changed through the act of knowing which is the 
overcoming of the dichotomy between knower and known. In this new 
perspective however, not the overcoming of a dichotomy, but, in fact, its 
opposite, the continual dichotomization of subject and object is the case for 
gaining knowledge. Thus, dichotomization allows for the deepening of 
consciousness and a holistic understanding of knowledge in place of the 
Hellenistic understanding.11 
As Morioka notes we did not ask to be born as our experience confirms, but 
we are here and our presence in this life is a positive reality. We are 
“some-thing,” not “no-thing,” in other words. Being some-thing is Morioka’s 
“birth affirmation,” as I see it. Being some-thing that lives and undergoes 
change with an apparent beginning and an end, raises the question of death. 
Human experience shows that things, inanimate and animate, that have a 
beginning also have an end. (It is questionable that animal life is capable of 
comprehending this truth of experience.) For many contemporary philosophers, 
death is the “negative” end to life, at least in the West. 
Within secular society Morioka notes that death is not necessarily a negative 
experience constituting an end. Rather, death defines a boundary, if I have 
understood him correctly. Since meaningfulness unto death, or meaningful 
boundaries to life, appear with the contingency of human experience in this 
world, certain Western philosophers accept that there is no “other world” in a 
                                                     
10 Strasser (1963), p. 7. 
11 Holism: The philosophical theory that parts of a whole are in a relationship such that they cannot 
exist, nor be understood, independently of the whole which itself is then regarded as greater than the 
sum of its parts. (Greek: ὅλον, holon). 
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Hellenistic sense. (This view is contrary to the dominant Western perspective, 
however, which accepts the existence of another world or plane of being.) For 
those counter-cultural philosophers there is no meaning in the notion of a “world 
to come.” It appears in the East, however, that for many individuals the dead 
continue to participate in the meaning of life because, in a certain sense, they 
have not left this world according to Morioka. From my perspective to what 
degree this notion of the dead among the living within one world will become a 
major philosophy, acceptable within Western thought, remains to be seen.  
How does one engage in the “practice of studying world philosophy” 
Morioka asks in the conclusion to his paper? Through re-visiting “particular” 
philosophies of our world, he suggests. Following up on his suggestion, then, I 
present a short consideration in the next section of a few points of significance 
for both Eastern and Western thinkers in light of Leslie Dewart’s understanding 
of the dehellenization of Western philosophy.12  
 
2. Dehellenization: a corrective activity within Philosophy of Life  
 
To be able to introduce something positive in apparently negative language 
is a skill within the Western philosophical tradition. I suggest that Leslie 
Dewart’s dehellenization of thought is an example of this. As a philosophical 
attitude his dehellenization is a positive description of an epistemological 
understanding in terms appropriate to our times, but in terms of consciousness 
which is considered often only a psychological state of mind. (Further, it is not 
to be confused with un-hellenization, a negative concept.) Robert Prentice, to 
my mind, has captured Dewart’s intent in introducing the attitude of 
dehellenization into epistemological thinking.  
 
As we have seen [Dewart] has abandoned the classical and scholastic 
concepts, but in doing so his purpose has been to render faith more 
acceptable in its critical foundations. In particular he has been driven by 
a desire to be guided by an empirical rather than an a priori method of 
approach, since, in his view one will find there the first step in a richer 
re-interpretation of the Christian or of any faith. This is an immediate 
concern of our age, since the experience which man is in the process of 
                                                     
12 Naturally, any philosophy or academic discipline not rooted in ancient Greek thought will not need 
to be dehellenized. 
 29
undergoing clamours for re-interpretation.13 
 
On occasion, Dewart has been understood as a theologian. I believe that this is a 
misunderstanding. He was a religious philosopher whose thinking included the 
theological values of the Christian faith. In his process of dehellenization values 
are carried by one’s faith, not by philosophical concepts. This view reverses the 
traditional order which is that concepts carry values for one’s faith. This 
epistemological stance cuts to the heart of the question “Is faith an (imperfect) 
form of knowledge?” As an activity of the mind, dehellenized thinking moves 
one away from understanding faith as an imperfect form of knowledge. Rather, 
faith is the meaning-carrying dimension of human existence and not a lower 
(inferior) form of, or substitute for, knowledge. Rather, faith (something animal 
life lacks) carries the values of cumulative human experience, at least this has 
been the record of the Western Christian experience.  
The aim of this section of my essay is to suggest that Leslie Dewart’s notion 
of dehellenization of thinking, among other of his notions, fits well within 
Morioka’s perspective on the philosophy of life, or thought about thought. 
Dewart’s Religion, Language and Truth (1970) popularly summarizes his overall 
thinking.14 
In the wake of the discoveries of contemporary social evolution, it may be to 
humanity’s advantage to preserve a multiplicity of philosophical attitudes, for 
the sake of the unity, not union, of philosophy itself. 15  Social evolution 
generates a dehellenized perspective of thought, since it is evolution directed by 
human beings for particular values. Natural evolution, as introduced by Charles 
Darwin, ultimately retains its Hellenistic concepts since it was dependent on 
these epistemological categories. In short, in a dehellenized understanding of 
thought, evolution becomes purposeful, that is, psychozoic as opposed to merely 
zoological. Therefore, a methodological union of thought need not remain a 
desired goal. Such a methodological union may even be counter-productive 
                                                     
13 Prentice (1971), p. 280.  
14  Giving his motivation for this book, Dewart writes: “A recent reviewer of my book, The 
Foundations of Belief, has suggested that I should write ‘a short, popular statement of [my] views, so 
that they may be made available to those [who may not have a professional level of] technical and 
historical knowledge. I wish I could say that this present book responds to this request, but in point of 
fact it goes only a short distance towards fulfilling it.’” [p. 9]. 
15 I distinguish evolution to humanity from evolution of humanity. The former is merely biological 
(externally directed), whereas the latter is self-directed (that is, consciously directed), hence one may 
speak of social evolution.  
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when diversity in understanding is what is experienced. It could be argued that, 
according to Dewart, a dehellenized attitude of consciousness is what is required 
in place of a union of concepts.  
In the West with regard to understanding the notion of truth, the judgement 
that opinion is incompatible with philosophy is a judgement in favour of 
philosophy’s ability to determine the truth. That is, it is presumed that 
philosophy necessarily achieves truth, whereas opinion may not. Thus, only 
traditional (classical) ideas of truth and reality, previously determined only by 
philosophy, can serve as a foundation for future philosophy. In contemporary 
Western culture classical philosophy is sometimes misunderstood as needing 
correction. However, it is Hellenistic philosophy, which is philosophy in the 
style of the ancient Greeks, that needs to be dehellenized in thought (corrected) 
in Dewart’s perspective. Classical philosophy remains proper to its historical 
time and epistemological context, which is, scholasticism.  
With regard to language, one may ask the question: Do humans speak to be 
social, or speak in order to be human? Dewart does not say “communicate” 
when he asks the question because it is generally uncontested that the 
individuals of many non-human life forms communicate with each other for 
social purposes. Language is not speech itself, but is the form of human speech 
which allows thinking to be expressed to oneself and to other human beings. 
With respect to the many cultural forms that language assumes in expressing 
experience none can claim to be the “right” one and, none may be considered 
the “wrong” one. However, with respect to specific contexts certain languages 
are more adequate than others. 
Dewart notes the following:  
 
There can be, on the other hand, more or less adequate languages in 
relation to given purposes. For speaking about the Arctic weather, the 
richness of the various Eskimo dialects is proverbial. For philosophizing 
in the Scholastic manner Latin is unsurpassed. For viewing the world 
scientifically, the modern European languages are especially apt.16 
 
Thus, diversity, language and speech, all understood from a dehellenized 
perspective of thought appear as proper topics for consideration within 
                                                     
16 Dewart (1970), p. 71.  
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Morioka’s philosophy of life.  
Morioka has indicated that he is interested in life within a secular society. 
Contemporary society, in itself, may be considered secular but the meaning that 
individuals give to their experience may not be so necessarily. A similar 
phenomenon can be seen to have taken place in our time concerning an 
understanding of Hellenist, or ancient Greek philosophy. In the minds of many 
academics, it is a common impression that in ancient Greek times philosophy 
was antagonist towards Greek religion.17 Ancient Greek philosophy may have 
been inimical to certain cults within Greek religion, “but it was never anything 
itself but a profoundly, and often enough even a consciously, religious 
institution,” according to Dewart.18 However, the Hellenic concept of religion 
(philosophy) is not to be equated with the contemporary concept of Western 
religion that Dewart sought to dehellenize. Their difference is found in their 
intent. Hellenic religion (philosophy) attempted to discover the individual’s 
assigned place in the cosmos as Fate had determined it. This was a legitimate 
undertaking for its time. However, in a dehellenized understanding (of 
Hellenistic religion) individuals attempt to interpret experience within the 
cosmos, disallowing any role of Fate. The cosmos is not fixed and can become 
other than it is. Not mere meaning, but meaningfulness that carries personal 
responsibility characterizes the dehellenized stance to life (religious or secular). 
Thus, meaningfulness as personal responsibility replaces the classic meaning of 
Fate.  
In expressing their intention through speech humans self-relate to their 
particular environmental and cultural contexts. (They also self-relate to 
themselves through speech which is but spoken thought.) Speech is carried by 
language within any philosophical system, secular or religious, intended to 
interpret experience. Common sense shows that the facts of life are the same for 
every creature. However, truth (religious or secular) is recognized only within 
human consciousness in thinking about thought, or, which is the same, thinking 
about the philosophy of life. 
In this context truth becomes the fidelity of consciousness to the facts of 
experience. Truth is not the adequation of the mind to an ideal in the Thomistic 
sense. Dewart maintains, that “human conscious experience does not transfer 
reality into the mind but, on the contrary, ‘transfers,’ the mind into the reality 
                                                     
17 Here, I am not referring to Hellenistic philosophy. 
18 Dewart (1970), p. 52.  
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within the world of which the mind already existed.”19 Truth is the mind’s 
faithful transfer of itself into experience in other words, which is the 
dehellenized activity of thought with the possibility of a creative relationship on 
the part of the knower. One’s mind becomes an agent of change and does not 
rely on any necessary a priori principles.  
Morioka mentions the problem of “life extension.” Realistically, however, I 
would suggest, since I follow Dewart, that it is a problem of understanding the 
overall nature of human life, along with its prolongation. If one wishes to 
understand the nature of human life, and its extension: 1) one must look to the 
world that humans bring about, that is, how humanity extends and projects itself 
outwardly through time and in space; and 2) how humanity shapes its 
undetermined future by consciously creating, that is, consciously directing 
evolution and living out a history for itself. That is to say, life is known by being 
contextually mediated in some fashion. As I understand Dewart, dehellenization 
of thought is a corrective act of consciously creating and living out a history for 
ourselves and thus an activity that qualifies as a philosophy of life, although 
restricted to Western and Westernized cultures. In our time, humanity in all its 
various cultural expressions must participate more consciously and deliberately 
in its own self-fashioning than it has done in the past. Dehellenization of 
Western-style thinking allows individuals to live simultaneously out of the past, 
within the present, and into the future. In other words, dehellenization of thought 
as an activity parallels Morioka’s philosophy of life and opens the possibility of 
the conscious creation of a future of philosophical belief, which is not 
necessarily a religious act.  
Lastly, philosophy of life, as an academic discipline, has a creative 
dimension not merely an interpretive one. That is, the human world does not 
have to remain the way humanity has inherited it. The human world may be 
consciously or unconsciously changed by human activity. Within Morioka’s 
philosophy of life there is the potential for recognizing a self-directed evolution, 
not merely a biological evolution given humanity’s participation within the 
cosmos.20 
 
 
 
                                                     
19 Dewart (1969), p. 271. 
20 See Dewart (1989). 
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3. Concluding Remarks  
 
Dehellenization of thought as an intellectual activity falls within Morioka’s 
philosophy of life considered as an academic discipline. Dehellenization affords 
the possibility of correcting the inadequacies of the inherited understanding of 
Western science and technology which have been influenced by Hellenistic 
philosophy. Human life is more than the conditioned physiology of living 
organisms as defined by contemporary biology. Human life has a conscious 
capacity resulting in intelligence. 
Uniquely, philosophy of life allows for a place and for a role of the observer 
in what is observed. Philosophy of life allows for a phenomenological 
methodology which transcends the classical Western Hellenistic, hence static, 
philosophical inheritance. In phenomenological methodology, an observer does 
not begin retrospectively with the chronological origin of human life. Rather, the 
phenomenological philosopher is situated in a life already “in progress” which 
reflects the past experience of previous generations. Thus, there is the 
recognition of an historical content within philosophy of life that is subject to 
improvement and development through time. When attempting any 
improvement and development of this historical content of life we recognize 
something about ourselves and others. What do we recognize? 
The first is to recognize that we may choose to become goal-oriented rather 
than remain goal-dictated. In being goal-oriented we find and select what we 
need to be human, based on our experience. Finding and selecting what we need 
in order to be human constitutes the difference in understanding life’s 
experiences meaningfully through philosophy and understanding those same 
experiences non-philosophically, that is, scientifically and technologically. 
Secondly, in attempting improvement and development in life we recognize a 
unique difference between animal and human modes of life. Human life has the 
potential to develop an individual identity, a self, whereas animal life does not. 
Thirdly, when humans contemplate their understanding of life and death, or 
philosophize about life and death, and the meaning it holds for them as 
individuals and as a society, they often recognize this activity as religious and 
reserved to humans. However, this religious understanding need not be the 
monotheistic understanding of revealed religion (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). 
In light of the dehellenization of thought, religious understanding may include 
belief as understood philosophically, or as any form of myth or ideology. In 
 34
short, Morioka’s philosophy of life presents a forum for understanding 
dehellenization as a continual process of diversification in human understanding 
and expressions of thought appropriate for both Asian and Western thinkers.  
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